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Cautions about precautions
Commentary on Birch on Precautionary Principle

Jay R. Stauffer, Jr.
Ecosystem Science and Management
Penn State University
Abstract: Assuming an animal to be sentient in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary is an
extreme position, hence it should not and could not be the default assumption. Birch explains how the
precautionary principle may be used to substantiate decisions to give the animal the benefit of doubt.
Although I am reluctant to accept all of his points, Birch has provided an excellent argument for the use of
the precautionary principle for the detection of animal sentience. I agree that more research is needed to
refine and understand this relationship.
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Birch (2017) posits the quantity and quality of data needed to convince us that an organism is
sentient. He distinguishes between a broad sense of sentience that considers organisms’
subjective experiences of the world and a narrower one that focuses on subjective experiences
with an attractive or aversive quality (e.g., pain, suffering, pleasure, joy, etc.). He argues that the
narrower meaning is what is used in animal welfare science and animal ethics. Although the
precautionary principle was originally used to direct environmental policy and later public health,
he proposes an Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP) that would prevent “serious,
negative animal welfare outcomes.” Birch employs two rules provided by John (2011) for
precautionary principles. First, the epistemic rule is that if scientific data suggest a causal
relationship of sentience, one should set an intentionally low evidential bar. Second, the decision
rule is that once such evidence is demonstrated, we should proceed in a timely and cost-effective
manner to implement actions that prevent aversive outcomes. To assume that an animal is
sentient in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary is an extreme position, hence it
should not and could not be the default assumption.
Birch’s two proposals — the first for the epistemic rule (BAR), and the second for the
decision rule (ACT), are the following:
BAR — For the purposes of formulating animal protection legislation, there is sufficient
evidence that animals of a particular order are sentient if there is statistically significant
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evidence, obtained by experiments that meet normal scientific standards, of the presence
of at least one credible indicator of sentience in at least one species of that order.
ACT — We should aim to include within the scope of animal protection legislation all
animals for which the evidence of sentience is sufficient, according to the standard of
sufficiency outlined in BAR.
Birch gives examples of classes (e.g., Cephalopoda, Malacostraca) and several orders (e.g.,
Salmoniformes, Gadiformes, Cypriniformes) to support the use of orders rather than some other
level in the Linnaean hierarchy. These arguments cannot be justified. I regard species as
ontological individuals (sensu Ghiselin 1997). Since levels above the species (e.g., genus, family,
order, class) began with a single speciation event, these higher levels are also ontological
individuals. There are no guidelines, however, for grouping species into genera, genera into
families, families into orders, etc. As long as each level is composed of a monophyletic
assemblage, it is valid under the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature. For example,
Mayden (1989) elevated a subgenus of Notropis, i.e., Cyprinella, to genus level. The division of the
ranks above the species level is governed in part by our knowledge of the diversity of the groups.
Perhaps Birch should consider the size of selected groups rather than choosing a specific
phylogenetic level.
I applaud Birch’s arguments that there must be “credible indicators of sentience.” I
disagree with the examples cited from the literature and provided by him as methods to
determine these indicators. For example, an animal learns to administer pain-relief drugs (i.e.,
opioids) is taken as evidence of sentience. Perhaps, as in humans, it is sometimes just an example
of addiction. Furthermore, Birch’s argument about motivational tradeoffs is weak. He assumes
that if an animal avoids a stimulus, it was noxious and the avoidance indicates pain. I have
conducted numerous studies on temperature preference and avoidance in fishes (e.g., Stauffer
et al. 1974, 1976, 1980). Fishes will prefer certain temperatures and avoid others based on their
acclimation temperatures. These preferred temperatures differ based on sex and age (Stauffer et
al. 1985). Reynolds et al. (1976, 1978, 1980) demonstrated that pathogens of poikilotherms
exhibit a behavioral febrile response and thus result in a higher preferred temperature. These
behaviors were interpreted as a result of natural selection, not sentience.
Despite my reluctance to accept all of his points, Birch has provided an excellent argument
for the use of the precautionary principle for the detection of animal sentience. I agree that more
research is needed to refine and understand this relationship.
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